Bank Debt Use and Firm Size: Indian Evidence

The paper employs a sample of listed Indian manufacturing firms over the period 1995–2004 to examine the factors influencing the concentration of bank debt in total debt. The results indicate that the factors vary by firm size. Small to medium-sized firms have a high concentration of bank debt. The results support the reputation view that firms face differential debt choice as they grow larger. When evaluating bank regulations, policymakers need to consider the importance of the reputation-building service which banks provide to businesses.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

Oil price shocks on Indian economy: evidence from Toda Yamamoto and Markov regime-switching VAR

The study investigates the dynamic impact of linear and non-linear specifications of oil price shocks on macroeconomic fundamentals for an oil-importing emerging economy – India – during the period March 1991 to January 2009. The paper deploys extended vector autoregressive (VAR) model of possibly integrated processes proposed by Toda and Yamamoto, which has its advantage of application irrespective of the variables being stationary or cointegrated. The study further estimates two-state Markov regime-switch VAR model to examine regime shift behaviour of the underlying variables and its relationship. The study finds that inflation and foreign exchange reserve are greatly impacted by oil price shocks. The study also confirms that the movement in oil price is exogenous with respect to the movement of India’s macroeconomic variables and the impact of oil price shocks are asymmetric in nature with negative price shocks having more pronounced effect than positive shocks.     

Pecking order as a dynamic leverage theory

Static tradeoff theories, which do not explicitly treat the impact of transaction costs, do not explain the policy of asymmetry between frequent small debt transactions and infrequent large equity transactions. Nor do these theories explain why the debt ratio is allowed to wander a considerable distance from its alleged static optimum, or how much of a distance should be tolerated. We offer a class of diffusion models that mimic this behaviour in a stochastic-dynamic framework and are designed to optimize a financing strategy using any static tradeoff theory as input. The models developed reveal the determinants of the size and frequency of equity transactions and the range of values over which leverage variations are tolerated in four generic scenarios. They also yield a new formulation of the cost of capital that recognizes stochastic transaction costs and a penalty for deviation from any static-optimal leverage. Our class of models augments the pecking order theory, provides a flexible quantitative framework for its implementation as a decision tool, and facilitates the formulation of additional hypotheses for its empirical validation. Symmetrically, our results show the importance of dynamic factors in designing and interpreting empirical tests of static tradeoff theories. The results presented have important implications for the role played by static tradeoff theories in a stochastic-dynamic framework. One such implication is that the static-optimal leverage has no direct effect on the firm's leverage policy in this setting. The target leverage for refinancing transactions is different from the static-optimal leverage, and the mean leverage is generally different from both. As a consequence, the latter cannot be used to estimate the former. Another implication is that even when the mean leverage equals the static optimum, mean reversion is not an optimal behaviour and therefore not a legitimate test for the existence of a static tradeoff in a dynamic context. Still another implication is that wide variations in leverage ratios cannot be interpreted as evidence of leverage indifference. It follows that the pecking order theory is consistent with static tradeoff theories and does not require the assumption of leverage indifference.     

Does R&D intensity influence leverage? Evidence from Indian firm-level data

The paper examines the association between corporate leverage and their investment in R&D. Towards this end, it develops certain testable propositions. These propositions are tested using a dataset of manufacturing firms in India covering the period 1995?C2010. Three main results are gleaned from the analysis. First, the optimal leverage ratio typically declines with R&D intensity. Second, the financial crisis has exerted a negative effect on leverage for firms. And finally, the dampening effect of R&D intensity on leverage is the highest for foreign private firms.     

Optimum allocation in stratified sampling with replacement

In a stratified sample, when sampling is done with replacement in each stratum a better estimate of the population mean can be achieved by considering the distinct units only. An explicit expression for the variance for the mean, of a stratified sample based on the distinct units only, is obtained. Then the optimum allocation for the different stratum are obtained by minimizing this variance subject to (i) total sample size being fixed, or (ii) the expected number of distinct units being fixed. Neyman’s solutions are obtained as special cases. The solutions finally arrived at are algebraically complex, hence, numerical methods are applied. In all examples, the variance of the estimates obtained by this method are smaller than the variances obtained by Neyman’s allocation. A part of this work was supported by the Office of the Ordinance Research; U.S.A. Grant (DA-AROL(D)-31-124-G83) when the author was at University of California, Berkeley.     

A Model of Household Grocery Shopping Behavior

The shopping trip to the grocery store is one of the most basic elements of consumer behavior. The authors seek to provide an understanding of the factors that account for variations in shopping behavior across households. They present a model of shopping behavior that assumes that households seek to minimize the travel cost associated with shopping and the cost of holding goods in inventory. As in the classic EOQ model, observed shopping behavior reflects the manner in which households balance these costs while meeting their consumption needs. A number of propositions derived from the model are tested using data on shopping trips made by households over a one-year period. The results support the model and indicate that the relationship between household characteristics and shopping behavior can be fairly complex: for some households shopping may have a recreational aspect while for others it may compete directly with wage-earning activity.     

Using Electronic Response Systems in Economics Classes

College instructors and students participated in a pilot project at the University of Akron to enhance student learning through the use of a common teaching pedagogy, peer instruction. The teaching pedagogy was supported by the use of technology, an electronic personal response system, which recorded student responses. The authors report their experiences in using this technology-enhanced teaching pedagogy and provide another example of an active and collaborative learning tool that instructors can use to move beyond “chalk and talk.” Preliminary survey results from students participating in this pilot project are also reported.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.